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Is the Clean Water Act’s Diligent Prosecution Bar 
Jurisdictional?  
A Journey into Discovering Congressional Intent 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
During heavy rainfall, a municipality’s outfalls discharged storm 
water and raw sewage onto three Puerto Rican beaches, producing a 
foul odor that forced surfers to abandon the beaches altogether.1 In 
Louisiana, a city’s wastewater treatment plants were polluting the 
Mississippi River, resulting in untreated raw sewage contaminating 
private property.2 In another case, a farm illegally dumped poultry 
manure into a river, resulting in bacteria traveling in the river from 
the farm to someone else’s property.3 All of these recent cases 
involve an illegal discharge of pollutants into the waters of the 
United States, and all polluters were brought to court not by 
government agencies, but by private citizens seeking relief under the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”).4 
While all the aforementioned cases were heard on their merits, 
not all citizen suits make it that far because a case is often dismissed 
in its early stages for lack of jurisdiction over parties to a suit or over 
the claims alleged. There are several preliminary hurdles that a 
litigant must pass before a federal judge will hear a case. Firstly, a 
court must be able to enforce its ruling on the parties to the suit. In 
general, a citizen-plaintiff seeking relief under the CWA must have 
constitutional standing5 to bring a justiciable6 case in a federal court 
 
 1. Water Quality Prot. Coal. v. Municipality of Arecibo, 858 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 
(D.P.R. 2012). 
 2. La. Envtl. Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 3. Assateague Coastkeeper v. Alan & Kristin Hudson Farm, 727 F. Supp. 2d 433, 434 
(D. Md. 2010). 
 4. See supra notes 1–3. 
 5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff 
must show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to a defendant’s challenged action, which a 
favorable judicial decision will likely prevent or redress). Generally, courts also adhere to 
prudential standing requirements in addition to the constitutional requirements stated above. 
The CWA includes a provision that statutorily extends standing to the outer boundaries of 
Article III, so there is no need for a separate prudential standing inquiry. This provision says that 
citizen suits are authorized by “any citizen . . . on his own behalf . . . where there is alleged a 
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that has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.7 Secondly, the 
court must have subject-matter jurisdiction8 to hear the case; in 
other words, it must have the power to hear the claim.9 
Constitutional and statutory elements of jurisdiction are an 
“essential ingredient of separation and equilibrium of powers,” and 
when a court makes any pronouncements on the merits of a case 
when it has no jurisdiction to hear it, it is acting ultra vires.10 
Indeed, if the court lacks any of these jurisdictional elements, the 
case will be dismissed regardless of the strength of its merits.11 
Thus, courts address jurisdictional attacks before addressing an 
attack on the merits12 to avoid wasting time and expense on hearing 
a case that will have to be subsequently dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Once the jurisdictional threshold has been met, the 
defendant still has the means to prevent the suit from going forward. 
For example, a defendant can file a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted13—this is a motion 
on a case’s merits. As the Supreme Court held in Twombly, to survive 
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”14 Factual plausibility means that the court is 
able to draw, based on the plaintiff’s pleadings, a reasonable 
 
failure of the [EPA] Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (a)(2) (2012). See, e.g., Ecol. Rights 
Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 6. See Scott B. Garrison, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Standing, and Citizen Suits: The Effect of 
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 48 MD. L. REV. 403, 425 (“Justiciability 
questions the substantiality of the controversy, the issue’s ripeness for adjudication, and 
whether it is a political question reserved to the other branches of government.”). 
 7. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011). 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
 9. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). 
 10. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). 
 11. In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a case about an atheist father 
suing his child’s school for requiring the children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance—including 
the words “under God.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004). While 
the issue may have been strong on its merits, the Court infamously dismissed the complaint for 
the father’s lack of prudential standing to bring the case to federal court. Id. at 17. This case, 
which had received widespread media coverage, demonstrates the importance of a court’s power 
to declare the law. 
 12. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94–95. 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2009). 
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inference that the defendant is liable.15 A court must assume the 
veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations.16 Thus, it is very 
important for a plaintiff to be able to properly assert a court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction, because once such an assertion is made, 
the plaintiff’s claims are presumed to be true, and the case can move 
forward in court. 
According to Article III, § 1 of the United States Constitution, 
only Congress may determine a federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction.17 Thus, courts are entrusted with the task of 
ascertaining Congress’s intent about the jurisdictionality of a 
provision or rule. If the statute clearly says that a provision is 
jurisdictional, then the courts must defer to this and refuse to hear 
the case, and if the statute is silent, courts must treat it as non-
jurisdictional,18 unless intent can be discerned from the provision’s 
text, context, and relevant historical treatment.19 Many statutes 
include a litany of requirements that must be fulfilled before a court 
will hear a case, such as deadlines for filing an appeal to an 
administrative agency,20 deadlines for filing an appeal to a federal 
court,21 filing mandates on courts,22 and limitations on 
numerosity.23 In the CWA, for example, a case will be dismissed 
unless the citizen-plaintiff gives sixty days’ notice to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the state, and the alleged polluter 
(“sixty-day notice provision”), and a case will also be dismissed if 
the state has “diligently prosecuted” a claim (“diligent prosecution 
bar”).24 There has been great confusion among the courts as to 
whether Congress intended these CWA rules to speak to a court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a case. In other words, when 
citizen-plaintiffs fall short of meeting these statutory requirements, 
can a defendant successfully file to dismiss the entire suit for that 
 
 15. Id. at 556. 
 16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
 17. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 453 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
 18. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). 
 19. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 168 (2010). 
 20. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013). 
 21. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). 
 22. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010). 
 23. See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500. 
 24. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
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reason alone?25 Or, did Congress intend these jurisdictional 
provisions to be merely stepping stones that plaintiffs should meet 
before filing a suit, which, if deficient, may be cured in the process of 
litigation?26 
While traditionally courts have recognized only these two types 
of rules27—jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional—this strict 
dichotomy is a legal fallacy. This Comment argues that Congress 
intended the diligent prosecution bar to be something in-between a 
mandate and a stepping stone—i.e., the bar was intended to impose 
mandatory conditions on citizen-plaintiffs that, while not entirely 
removing subject-matter jurisdiction, often acquires jurisdictional 
characteristics. Part II will explain the two types of rules, explore the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of the distinction between the two, 
and introduce the concept of quasi-jurisdictionality. Part III provides 
background into the CWA, and discusses a recent Fifth Circuit 
decision, Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge 
(“LEAN”),28 which held that the diligent prosecution bar possessed 
no jurisdictional qualities. Part IV rebuts the reasoning used in the 
Fifth Circuit in LEAN by explaining that Congress really intended 
the diligent prosecution bar to be a mandatory, quasi-jurisdictional 
rule, and articulates reasons why this alternate interpretation is 
correct. Finally, Part V concludes. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL RULES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BEYOND 
Traditionally, legal issues have been categorized as either 
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional,29 but this Comment argues that 
this dichotomy is fallacious in the citizen suit context. Part II.A will 
explain jurisdictionality under the traditional dichotomy and Part 
II.B will describe some of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings on 
 
 25. If a provision speaks to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, it is a “jurisdictional” 
rule. See infra Part II.A. 
 26. If a provision does not speak to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, it is a “non-
jurisdictional” rule. See infra Part II.A. 
 27. Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“[J]urisdictional rigidity 
has led courts and commentators to overlook the fact that non[-]jurisdictional rules need not be 
the mirror inverse but may instead have attributes commonly associated with 
jurisdictionality.”). 
 28. 677 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 29. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 
(1994). 
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the issue, signifying a general shift in the understanding of 
jurisdictionality. Part II.C rejects the traditional dichotomy of 
jurisdictionality and refines the Supreme Court’s rulings on the 
matter, ultimately setting the stage for Part IV, which will argue that 
the diligent prosecution bar is quasi-jurisdictional. 
A. Jurisdictional Rules vs. Non-jurisdictional Rules 
Before delving into its central thesis, this Comment will explain 
basic concepts of jurisdictionality under the assumption that rules 
are either jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. Most courts adhere to 
this view, including the Supreme Court, albeit incorrectly. Indeed, 
whether or not a rule is jurisdictional can have “drastic” 
consequences for a case.30 If a rule is jurisdictional, it applies to the 
“prescriptions delineating . . . classes of cases . . . falling within a 
court’s adjudicatory authority.”31 If a jurisdictional rule is violated, 
the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Further, 
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction32 can be 
raised sua sponte, which means the motion can be raised by the 
court or any party at any point in the litigation—even in the middle 
of a case or after a ruling has been declared.33 Even if a party has 
acknowledged the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction during a case, 
the party can object to it at a later time.34 Practically, this means that 
“if the trial court lacked jurisdiction, many months of work on the 
part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted.”35 Additionally, a 
jurisdictional rule is not subject to principles of equity, such as 
waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel.36 In other words, if the court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court does not have the 
discretion to hold that the case can be heard, even if the litigating 
parties wish to waive the application of the rule. 
On the other hand, non-jurisdictional rules speak to the rights or 
obligations of parties instead of to the power of the court. Non-
jurisdictionality is concerned with “matters of procedure and 
 
 30. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
 31. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). 
 32. An objection to subject-matter jurisdiction is filed as a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure [“FRCP”] 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. 
 33. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012). 
 34. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Dodson, supra note 27, at 3. 
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substance”37 over which parties have control. Parties can choose 
which non-jurisdictional rules to litigate, and courts have discretion 
to “inject fairness and equity” if the situation warrants it; in other 
words, these rules can be waived, forfeited, consented to, and are 
subject to equitable exceptions.38 While jurisdictional rules can be 
raised sua sponte, non-jurisdictional rules will be forfeited if the 
party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.39 
There are two basic types of non-jurisdictional rules: “claim-
processing rules” and “substantive-merits rules.” Claim-processing 
rules “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring 
that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified 
times.”40 Examples of claim-processing rules include time 
constraints on filing a complaint to Bankruptcy Court,41 a 120-day 
limit for seeking review from the Veterans Court,42 or a time limit 
on a criminal defendant moving for a new trial.43 The second type of 
non-jurisdictional rule, the substantive-merits rule, asks whether the 
plaintiff’s allegations entitle him to relief.44 A substantive-merits 
rule determines “the validity and success of a substantive claim of 
right on its merits.”45 Another way to look at it is asking whether 
“the legal rule sued under establishes a right in the plaintiff and 
imposes a duty on the defendant.”46 An example is the provision in 
Title VII that requires an employer to have fifteen employees.47 If 
the employer does not have more than fifteen employees, it is not 
regulated by Title VII, and thus, a plaintiff does not have the right to 
sue under this statute. One way to explain the difference between a 
claim-processing rule and a substantive-merits rule is that the 
former is about “the rights and obligations within . . . litigation,”  
 
 
 37. Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2011). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004). 
 40. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203. 
 41. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456. 
 42. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204. 
 43. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005). 
 44. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
 45. Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 947, 948–49 (2011). 
 46. Id. at 950. 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (2012); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 
(2006). 
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while the latter is about “real-world rights and duties outside the 
four walls of the courtroom.”48 
B. The Supreme Court on Jurisdictional Rules 
While the distinction between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional rules may be simple in theory, it is far from clear in 
practice.49 There has been “rampant confusion and overuse” 
concerning the concept of jurisdictionality.50 Even the Supreme 
Court recognized that it can be confusing to distinguish between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional rules.51 The Court has 
nicknamed this confusion “drive-by jurisdictional rulings,” wherein 
courts assume rules assumed to be jurisdictional with no further 
discussion or precedential effect.52 
To address the problem of drive-by jurisdictional rulings, the 
Supreme Court has, in recent years, endeavored to “bring some 
discipline to the use” of the term “jurisdictional” by effectively 
limiting the number of rules that can be considered as such.53 The 
Court has encouraged lower “courts and litigants to ‘facilitat[e]’ 
clarity by using the term ‘jurisdictional’ only when it is apposite.”.54 
This encouragement has been a welcome turn of events for several 
reasons. Courts misinterpreting rules to be jurisdictional are defying 
Congress’s intent, albeit unintentionally, because only Congress has 
authority to deem a provision jurisdictional. Moreover, legislatures 
and courts should maintain clear and sharp lines between issues, and 
success or failure on the merits or procedure should not affect 
whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.55 
Plaintiffs are especially hurt when courts dismiss cases this way. 
Courts generally resolve disputes of facts that apply to subject-
matter jurisdiction, but juries are the fact-finder for substantive-
merits issues.56 If too many rules are mislabeled as jurisdictional, 
the fact-finding responsibility will be shifted from the jury to the 
 
 48. Wasserman, supra note 45, at 958. 
 49. Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 4, 55 (2011). 
 50. Wasserman, supra note 45, at 948. 
 51. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010). 
 52. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998). 
 53. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). 
 54. Reed, 559 U.S. at 161 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). 
 55. Wasserman, supra note 45, at 949. 
 56. Id. at 954. 
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court,57 and plaintiffs’ claims will therefore fail to be heard by a jury. 
Finally, there would be disastrous effects on judicial economy, 
especially since courts would be obliged to raise issues sua sponte, 
and parties would be able to challenge holdings even after the court 
has ruled on the merits. 
With all this in mind, the Court decided Kontrick v. Ryan,58 the 
first case in the so-called shift in Supreme Court understanding of 
the jurisdiction doctrine. In Kontrick, a debtor filed for bankruptcy 
and the creditor objected, claiming that the debtor had transferred 
property with the intent to defraud creditors, and thus did not 
qualify for discharge under the bankruptcy law.59 After the 
bankruptcy court held in favor of the creditor, the debtor urged that 
one of the creditor’s claims was untimely under certain provisions of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.60 The debtor claimed 
that these rules established a mandatory, unalterable time limit that 
was jurisdictional.61 The Court disagreed, holding that the filing 
deadlines were non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules because 
they did not delineate which cases the bankruptcy courts were 
competent to adjudicate.62 
Two years later, the Court again decided whether a rule is 
jurisdictional in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.63 In this case, a waitress filed 
a Title VII action against her former employer, charging sexual 
harassment.64 Two weeks after the trial court entered judgment, the 
defendant employer moved to dismiss the entire action for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction because the defendant had fewer than 
fifteen employees, and Title VII was therefore not applicable.65 The 
Court held that the employee-numerosity requirement was non-
jurisdictional because it appeared in a provision that did not speak in 
jurisdictional terms, and, importantly, because this provision was 
separate from Title VII’s jurisdictional provision.66 The Court 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. 540 U.S. 443 (2004). 
 59. Id. at 449. 
 60. Id. at 451. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 454. 
 63. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 64. Id. at 504. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 515. 
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asserted that when Congress does not explicitly state that a statutory 
limitation is jurisdictional, then courts must treat the limitation as 
non-jurisdictional in character.67 
In a third case, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,68 the Court 
interpreted whether a provision of the copyright laws was 
jurisdictional. The Copyright Act specifies that anyone who violated 
the rights of a copyright owner was an infringer of the copyright, and 
when this occurred, the owner was entitled, subject to the 
requirements of section 411, to proceed with an action of copyright 
infringement.69 Section 411 provided that no civil action could be 
instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim 
was made.70 The Court held that the statute did not clearly state 
that the registration requirement was jurisdictional, as the 
requirement was located in a provision separate from those granting 
the courts subject-matter jurisdiction.71 Additionally, the Court 
found that there were no factors suggesting that section 411 could 
be read to speak in jurisdictional terms.72 Factors indicating that 
Congress may have meant a statute to be jurisdictional include the 
rule’s text, context, and relevant historical treatment.73  
Not all recent holdings have construed jurisdictionality so 
narrowly. In Bowles v. Russell,74 a man was sentenced to life in prison 
and filed a habeas corpus application but was denied relief.75 He 
failed to file notice of appeal within the thirty-day required period, 
and later moved for a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(1)(A) fourteen-day extension.76 Instead of extending the time 
by the fourteen days, the district court inexplicably extended the 
time allowed for notice of appeal by seventeen days.77 The Sixth 
Circuit held that the requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal 
was jurisdictional and since the man failed to file notice within 
 
 67. Id. at 516. 
 68. 559 U.S. 154 (2010). 
 69. Id. at 157. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 165. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 551 U.S. 205 (2007). 
 75. Id. at 207. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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fourteen days, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear 
the case.78 The Supreme Court agreed. The Court said that despite 
the new understanding of the importance of the distinction between 
jurisdictional and claim-processing rules, the statutory time limit for 
filing an appeal is different79 because the time limit had long been 
treated by the Court itself as jurisdictional.80 Bowles remains 
something of an enigma because it is the only recent Supreme Court 
decision to hold that a provision is jurisdictional. In Reed, which was 
decided three years later, Justice Thomas clarified that the reason 
why the statute in Bowles was jurisdictional was not because the 
statute itself had long been labeled jurisdictional; rather, the 
provision represented a type of limitation that was properly 
designated as jurisdictional.81 
In fact, the Supreme Court limited its own holding in Bowles in a 
subsequent case on filing deadlines in Henderson v. Shinseki.82 In 
Henderson, a Korean War veteran suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia applied for supplemental disability benefits based on 
his need for additional care.83 He missed the 120-day filing deadline 
by 15 days, and the Veterans Court, interpreting Bowles to compel 
jurisdictional treatment of the filing deadline, dismissed the 
veteran’s untimely appeal.84 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the 120-day filing deadline was a “quintessential claim-
processing rule.”85 The Court held that Bowles was inapplicable 
because that holding was limited to appeals from one court to 
another and did not extend to appeals from administrative to judicial 
courts.86 The Court added that the language of the filing deadline 
provision of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act provided no clear 
indication that Congress wanted the provision to be treated as  
 
 
having jurisdictional attributes, thus failing the bright-line rule 
 
 78. Id. at 207–08. 
 79. Id. at 210. 
 80. Id. at 212–13. 
 81. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 167 (2010). 
 82. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011). 
 83. Id. at 1201. 
 84. Id. at 1201–02. 
 85. Id. at 1203. 
 86. Id. at 1203–04. 
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established in Arbaugh.87 
Moreover, the provision was placed in a subchapter entitled 
“Procedure,” demonstrating Congress’s intent that the deadline was 
a claim-processing rule.88 Notably, Congress did not place the 120-
day limit in the subchapter entitled, “Organization and 
Jurisdiction.”89 A provision in the “Procedure” subchapter included 
some limits to the court’s review, such as precluding review of the 
disability ratings schedule, but nothing addressed the time limit for 
seeking review.90 One final argument the Court addressed was the 
context of the provision. Congress has had a tradition of enacting 
laws that favor veterans in the course of administrative and judicial 
review of veterans’ affairs.91 Thus, there was a “dramatic” distinction 
between ordinary civil litigation, such as that seen in Bowles, and the 
adjudication of veterans’ benefits claims.92 
C. A Pitch for Quasi-jurisdictional Rules 
Perhaps some of the confusion in this area of the law stems from 
the faultiness of the fundamental assumption that a rule must be 
either jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. This dichotomy is 
misleading because it “obscures a middle path that may be more 
accurate.”93 Sometimes, a rule will be classified as non-jurisdictional 
but will have jurisdictional qualities—a rule this Comment will call 
“quasi-jurisdictional.”94 While few courts have explicitly used the 
quasi-jurisdictional label, many, including the Supreme Court, have 
hinted at its existence. For example, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
 
 87. Id. at 1205. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1206. 
 93. Dodson, supra note 27, at 6. 
 94. There is no uniform nomenclature for rules that are non-jurisdictional but have 
jurisdictional qualities. Some commentators refer to such rules as quasi-jurisdictional. See, e.g., 
Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisidictional 
Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 315 n.59 (2011); Scott C. Idleman, The 
Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 96 n.532 
(2001). The term “quasi-jurisdictional” is used throughout this Comment, although an 
alternative label, such as a “hybridized jurisdiction,” would also be appropriate. See, e.g., Dodson, 
supra note 37, at 1444, 1457. 
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United States,95 the special six-year statute of limitations governing 
suits against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims was 
described as a “more absolute” limitations period.96 Unlike other 
statute of limitations defenses that are subject to equitable 
considerations, the statute in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. forbade 
courts from such considerations.97 Certain rules of criminal 
procedure may be classified as non-jurisdictional, but are 
“admittedly inflexible.”98 Similarly, state sovereign immunity can be 
waived by defendants, although courts cannot refuse to apply it once 
properly invoked.99 In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, a case that will 
be further explored below,100 a provision requiring plaintiffs to give 
notice to violators of the CWA before filing suit was described as 
being a “mandatory . . . condition precedent” to suit, with none of 
the equitable considerations being applicable.101 In all of these cases, 
the Court has fallen short of labeling the rule as jurisdictional, but it 
has firmly hinted that certain rules, while not jurisdictional, still 
impose mandatory conditions on litigants, much as a jurisdictional 
rule would. 
Another argument for recognizing an alternative to the 
jurisdictionality dichotomy is that the concept of quasi-
jurisdictionality is in conformity with the recently developed 
doctrine of resequencing.102 Traditionally, issues of jurisdiction had 
to be resolved at the outset of litigation while the later phases of 
litigation focused on the merits of the case.103 In recent cases, the 
Supreme Court has departed from this formal understanding.104 
While subject-matter jurisdiction is still always decided in the first 
phase, other procedural considerations have sometimes taken 
precedence. One example is resequencing, wherein the Court allows 
a case to be dismissed by a procedural doctrine without first 
establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
 
 95. 552 U.S. 130 (2008). 
 96. Id. at 134. 
 97. Id. at 133–35. 
 98. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005). 
 99. Dodson, supra note 37, at 1441. 
 100. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 101. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 26 (1989). 
 102. Dodson, supra note 38, at 1455. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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case.105 Resequencing is a bit odd, especially when considered 
alongside the Court’s renewed interest in jurisdictionality, which is 
often interpreted strictly. However, recognizing quasi-
jurisdictionality neatly resolves this seeming contradiction. A rule 
need not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction but can still place 
mandatory restrictions on a lawsuit; thus, a court can theoretically 
dismiss a case based on another doctrine that is less “jurisdictional.” 
Indeed, there are many other advantages of a quasi-jurisdictional 
rule. One type of quasi-jurisdictional rule is the mandatory rule, 
which is subject to the principles of equity—such as waiver, consent, 
and forfeiture—but is “immune to equitable excuses for 
noncompliance.”106 Under the mandatory rule, principles of equity 
allow parties to designate which issues require the court’s attention 
and which issues can be foregone.107 Courts are relieved from the 
duty of policing the rule sua sponte, and may address the issue only 
if it has been properly raised by the parties.108 This conserves 
judicial resources and promotes flexibility.109 Moreover, the fact that 
such a rule precludes “equitable excuses incentivizes compliance,” 
and “constrains judicial discretion and thus promotes fairness.”110 
The CWA diligent prosecution bar fits neatly into this category, and 
this argument will be further developed following an overview of the 
history of the bar’s jurisdictionality. 
III. THE JURISDICTIONALITY OF THE DILIGENT PROSECUTION BAR 
In 2012, the Fifth Circuit issued a groundbreaking ruling in 
Louisiana Environmental Action Network (“LEAN”) v. City of Baton 
Rouge,111 holding that the diligent prosecution bar was a non-
jurisdictional claim-processing rule.112 Lower courts had almost 
consistently held, without much analysis, that this was a 
jurisdictional provision—a prime example of a drive-by jurisdictional 
ruling. Part III.A will begin by providing background information to 
 
 105. Id. (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 
(2007)). 
 106. Dodson, supra note 28, at 4. 
 107. Id. at 10. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 677 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 112. Id. at 749. 
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the CWA and the diligent prosecution bar, and by giving examples of 
drive-by jurisdictional rulings. Part III.B will explain the facts of 
LEAN, and will introduce the Fifth Circuit’s analysis. 
A. Citizen Suits and the Diligent Prosecution Bar 
The CWA was enacted for the restoration and maintenance of 
“the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”113 The CWA prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant” into 
navigable waters of the United States without a permit.114 The 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) 
permits contain limitations on the amount of pollutants that a 
source can discharge, and contain monitoring and reporting 
requirements.115 Point sources that discharge without a permit or 
those that violate sections of a NPDES permit are subject to 
administrative, civil, and criminal penalties.116 
While local and state governments, along with the 
Environmental Protection Agency, are the primary enforcers of the 
CWA, “Congress has increasingly come to rely upon private law 
enforcement as a means of attaining public objectives.”117 Private 
citizens and environmental groups act as “private attorneys 
general,”118 assisting in “enforcement efforts where Federal and 
State authorities appear unwilling to act.”119 The citizen suit 
provision of the CWA states: 
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction 
. . . [A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf— 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent 
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is 
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation 
 
 113. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 114. Id. § 1311(a). 
 115. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 410 (2007). 
 116. Id. at 418. 
 117. Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 
339 (1990). 
 118. Id. at 340. 
 119. N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the administrator or a 
State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which 
is not discretionary with the Administrator . . . 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce 
such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to 
order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case 
may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties . . . .120 
The authority given to citizen-plaintiffs, however, is not endless. 
Congress wanted to provide some limitation on the range of 
potential plaintiffs121 because the more enforcers that exist, the 
more potential there is for “successive, possibly disruptive and 
conflicting, enforcement.”122 Hence, there are two notice limitations 
in the CWA that preclude a citizen suit: 
(b) Notice 
No action may be commenced— 
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section— 
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which 
the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the 
standard, limitation, or order, or 
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or 
order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any 
citizen may intervene as a matter of right.123 
These two notice limitations avoid burdening courts with 




 120. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1–2) (2006). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent Prosecution” Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 63, 66 (2003). 
 123. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A–B) (2006). 
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opportunity to bring themselves into compliance with the CWA and 
render a citizen suit unnecessary.124 
This Comment will focus on the second notice limitation, often 
referred to as the “diligent prosecution bar.” While citizen-
plaintiffs—private attorneys general—play an important role in the 
enforcement of the CWA, ultimately, Congress has reserved the 
primary responsibility of enforcement to state and local 
governments;125 indeed, citizen suits are meant to “supplement 
rather than to supplant governmental action.”126 Once the 
government diligently prosecutes a violation, the need for a citizen 
suit disappears.127 Generally, a government action is presumed to be 
diligent as long as it is calculated in good faith to require compliance 
with the CWA.128 The CWA directs regulatory bodies to either issue 
a compliance order or to initiate a civil enforcement action in order 
to bring the violator into compliance.129 Deference to agencies and 
governments is not unlimited, and courts examine the context of the 
enforcement actions to determine whether they were diligent.130 
Some of the factors courts consider are the time spent enforcing 
administrative compliance orders and other mandates, whether or 
not actions required of violators were “mandatory and ongoing,” and 
whether the government is capable of requiring compliance in the 
future.131 
 
 124. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 28, 29 (1989) (quoting Gwaltney of 
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. 
 127. Id. at 60–61. 
 128. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Maple Coal Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 868, 884 (S.D.W. Va. 
2011). 
 129. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012) (holding that a compliance order is a 
final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy other than judicial review). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See., e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 
1991) (holding that a state diligently prosecuted a town even though it did not assess penalties 
because the compliance order was analogous to the citizen action and should be favored by a 
court); Ohio Valley, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (holding that the state was diligently prosecuting a 
town because it imposed mandatory and ongoing responsibilities on the polluter, such as 
requiring the polluter to submit regular test results from groundwater monitoring wells, to 
spend close to one million dollars to build a new treatment facility, and to enforce a new sewer 
hookup moratorium); Newburgh v. Sarna, 690 F. Supp. 2d 136, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding 
that a state was diligently prosecuting a development project when the state issued civil 
penalties and an order compelling the project to take certain remedial measures); N.Y. Coastal 
Fishermen’s Ass’n v. New York City, 772 F. Supp. 162, 168–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that 
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The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on whether the CWA’s 
diligent prosecution bar is jurisdictional or not. For most appellate 
courts that have addressed the issue—including the Third,132 
Fourth,133 Seventh,134 and Ninth135 Circuits—it has not even been a 
question that the diligent prosecution bar confers subject-matter 
jurisdiction. For example, in Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investment 
Co., a cattle feeder operation appealed from a district court’s grant of 
an investment company’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction because of the diligent prosecution bar.136 The 
 
the city’s two administrative compliance orders did not constitute diligent prosecution because 
these enforcement measures took too long to rectify an environmental issue and the court was 
not satisfied that the state would enforce its demands). 
 132. In Student Public Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., a citizen group 
sued a manufacturer of fragrances for violations of its NPDES permit. 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 
1985). The court ultimately dismissed the case for other reasons, but it was very clear on this 
matter: the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a citizen suit under the CWA if the 
proceeding was being diligently prosecuted. Id. at 1134. The court explained that the diligent 
prosecution bar was an exception to the jurisdiction granted in subsection (a) of section 505. Id. 
at 1135. 
 133. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. American Recovery, two citizen groups gave notice to the 
defendant state of Maryland that they would sue for the state’s violations of effluent discharge 
permits. 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985). The citizen groups filed suit, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency filed its suit later that same day. Id. at 208. The defendant state responded to 
the citizen groups’ suit with a motion to dismiss, on the grounds that it was duplicative of the 
government suit, which the court granted. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the 
motion to dismiss should not have been granted because the CWA citizen suit provision granted 
that citizens could proceed with their suit unless the state had commenced its own enforcement 
action beforehand. Id. This was not the case here; the citizens filed their suit on the same day as 
the government, but three hours earlier, so they met section 505’s timeliness requirements. Id. 
Thus, had the government filed its suit before the citizen groups, the case would have been 
properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. While this case is a few decades 
old, the principle that the diligent prosecution bar is an exception to section 505 jurisdiction has 
recently been affirmed by this circuit in Piney Run Preservation Ass’n v. Carroll County. 523 F.3d 
453 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 134. In Friends of Milwaukee Rivers v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, a citizen 
group filed suit against the Milwaukee Sewerage District alleging CWA permit violations. 556 
F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2009). After giving notice, the group filed suit in the district court, and 
later that day, the state of Wisconsin also filed suit. Id. The state and the Sewerage District 
reached a settlement imposing mandatory and ongoing obligations on the violator, which then 
moved to dismiss the citizen suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the violator was 
diligently prosecuted. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that the CWA did not bar the suit. Id. at 
606. The court explained, citing section 505, that normally the CWA “strips the courts of 
subject[-]matter jurisdiction over citizens’ suits where the State has timely commenced judicial 
or administrative enforcement actions,” but that the bar did not apply in this case because the 
citizen suit was filed before the state’s suit. Id. 
 135. Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 136. Id. 
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Ninth Circuit reversed and held for the cattle feeder operation, 
noting that while a district court’s factual findings on all 
jurisdictional issues must be accepted unless they are clearly 
erroneous137—thereby affirming that the diligent prosecution bar 
was jurisdictional—because no action was being prosecuted at the 
time of the cattle feeder operation’s lawsuit, the diligent prosecution 
bar did not apply.138 Thus, the district court erred in granting the 
motion to dismiss because “a state must have commenced and be 
diligently prosecuting an action” in order for the CWA’s diligent 
prosecution bar to apply.139 
B. LEAN v. Baton Rouge 
This apparently unanimous understanding was broken with the 
Fifth Circuit’s holding in LEAN.140 In LEAN, the city of Baton 
Rouge and the parish of East Baton Rouge operated three 
wastewater treatment facilities that discharged treated sanitary 
wastewater into the Mississippi River.141 LEAN, an environmental 
group, claimed that there were ongoing NPDES violations at the 
three facilities and filed a citizen suit pursuant to CWA section 
505.142 The defendant city filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
FRCP 12(b)(6), arguing that the citizen suit was barred under the 
diligent prosecution provision.143 LEAN responded by arguing the 
inadequacy of the city’s enforcement actions, and by contending that 
the diligent prosecution bar was not jurisdictional.144 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with LEAN, becoming the first circuit 
court to expressly hold that the provision is non-jurisdictional. Its 
first line of reasoning was that according to Arbaugh’s “readily 
administrable bright line rule,” a provision is jurisdictional only if 
Congress clearly states that it is, and when Congress is silent, the 
statute shall be considered non-jurisdictional.145 Congress was silent 
in the CWA, so the Fifth Circuit asserted that the presumption 
 
 137. Id. at 516. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. La. Envl. Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 141. Id. at 740. 
 142. Id. at 742. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 745. 
 145. Id. at 747. 
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should be that the provision is non-jurisdictional. Also, the fact that 
section 505 spoke in mandatory language was not considered 
relevant.146 
Next, the court tried to see if there were contextual reasons 
under Reed to hold that the provision was jurisdictional. It looked at 
the positioning of the diligent prosecution bar in the notice section 
of the CWA.147 Because the other notice requirement, the sixty-day 
notice provision, is a typical claim-processing rule, the placement of 
the diligent prosecution bar beside it suggests that Congress 
similarly intended it to be non-jurisdictional.148 The court pointed 
out that the provision is located separately from the part of section 
505 granting federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
CWA, in a section that does not pertain to or refer to jurisdiction.149 
The court found that the final Reed factor, historical treatment, does 
not apply either, because no Supreme Court cases have determined 
that the diligent prosecution bar or any similar provision is 
jurisdictional.150 The court ultimately remanded the case to the 
district court to determine whether there was diligent prosecution 
precluding LEAN’s suit.151 
This case has sent shockwaves in the environmental law 
realm,152 because what was once regarded as a cut-and-dry tenet of 
environmental law is no longer true. This Comment agrees that the 
diligent prosecution bar is not purely jurisdictional. The recent 
Supreme Court cases, with the exceptions of John R. Sand & Gravel 
Co. and the oft-criticized153 Bowles, have all pointed to a trend of 
 
 146. Id. at 748 (noting that the Supreme Court “has rejected the notion that ‘all mandatory 
prescriptions, however emphatic, are . . . properly typed ‘jurisdictional’” (quoting Henderson 
ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (2011))). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 748–49. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 750. 
 152. David G. Samuels, Note, Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. City of Baton 
Rouge: Fifth Circuit Rules Clean Water Act’s Diligent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits Is 
Nonjurisdictional?, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 118 (2012) (“The Fifth Circuit’s determination . . . 
marks a watershed moment for citizen enforcement suits brought under CWA and similar 
laws.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, A Critical Assessment of the Cultural and Institutional Roles of 
Appellate Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 233 (2007) (book review) (asserting that it must 
be the aim of professional education to “demean such disgraceful nonsense as that expressed in 
the majority opinion” in Bowles); Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. 
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recognizing fewer rules as jurisdictional. The CWA does not state 
that the diligent prosecution bar should be jurisdictional. Context-
based arguments are weak, too. While both Bowles and John R. Sand 
& Gravel Co. had strong stare decisis reasons to uphold special 
statute of limitations rules to be jurisdictional, this simply does not 
exist for the diligent prosecution bar. The drive-by jurisdictional 
appellate court holdings are easily distinguishable from the decades 
and even centuries-old precedents from these two Supreme Court 
cases. The author has found no examples of cases where the diligent 
prosecution bar was brought up by an appellate court sua sponte, or 
any cases where an appellate court vacated a decision it made on the 
merits because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the first place. 
Thus, LEAN arrived at the proper conclusion—that the diligent 
prosecution bar is non-jurisdictional; however, it did so for the 
wrong reasons. 
IV. THE DILIGENT PROSECUTION BAR IS QUASI-JURISDICTIONAL—AND 
PROUD OF IT 
The LEAN court falsely stated that Congress did not intend for 
the diligent prosecution bar to be treated as having jurisdictional 
attributes.154 Congress intended the diligent prosecution bar to be 
non-jurisdictional in certain respects, while also possessing 
jurisdictional qualities; therefore, it was meant to be quasi-
jurisdictional. Part IV.A will explain why the Fifth Circuit was wrong 
in its analysis. Part IV.B will argue that Congress’s true intention 
was for the diligent prosecution bar to be quasi-jurisdictional. 
A. LEAN Was Incorrectly Decided 
LEAN was incorrectly decided for two reasons: (1) under 
Supreme Court precedent, neither the diligent prosecution bar nor 
the sixty-day notice provision is meant to be a purely non-
jurisdictional claim-processing rule or a substantive-merits rule; (2) 
the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize a glaring internal inconsistency 
in the Seventh Circuit precedent cited for support of its holding. 
 
 
REV. 631 (2008); Vincent Pavlish, Bowles v. Russell: They Got Me on a Technicality, 70 MONT. L. 
REV. 147 (2009). 
 154. La. Envtl. Action v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 748 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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1. Under Supreme Court precedent, neither the diligent prosecution bar nor the 
sixty-day notice provision is meant to be a purely non-jurisdictional claim-
processing rule or a substantive-merits rule 
The LEAN court not only held that the diligent prosecution bar 
is non-jurisdictional, but it implied that it was a claim-processing 
rule. It quoted Supreme Court cases that interpreted claim-
processing rules for evidence that the provision was non-
jurisdictional. It cited the Court’s dicta in Reed, acknowledging that 
“the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-
processing rules can be confusing in practice.”155 In the following 
paragraph, the LEAN court lamented about the practice of 
mischaracterizing claim-processing and jurisdictional rules. In a later 
section, the CWA sixty-day notice provision was characterized as a 
“typical ‘claim-processing rule.’”156 Citing Henderson, the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that placement of the diligent prosecution bar next 
to the sixty-day notice provision, a “typical ‘claim-processing 
rule,’”157 meant that it too was non-jurisdictional. Additionally, the 
fact that the bar is separate from a provision granting jurisdiction 
meant that the rule was merely procedural.158 The Fifth Circuit 
correctly stated that the “title of a statute or section can aid in 
resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text,”159 and that a 
provision placed in a subchapter with a procedural title alongside a 
claim-processing rule is likely also procedural.160 
However, the “notice” provisions are not claim-processing rules. 
This much has already been decided by the Supreme Court in 
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,161 a case upon which the Fifth Circuit 
should have relied much more extensively. In Hallstrom, owners of a 
dairy farm commenced an action against a landfill operation alleging 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act162 (“RCRA”) violations.163 
The landfill operation moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that 
 
 155. Id. at 746 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010)). 
 156. Id. at 748. 
 157. Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (quoting Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1205). 
 160. Id. 
 161. 493 U.S. 20 (1989). 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2006). 
 163. Hallstrom, 439 U.S. at 23. 
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the plaintiffs had failed to notify the state enforcement agency of 
their intent to sue as required by RCRA.164 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the failure to comply with the sixty-day notice 
provision deprived the district court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.165 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that if an 
action is barred by the terms of the statute, it must be dismissed, 
stating that “compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a 
mandatory, not optional, condition precedent for suit.”166 
The most important and relevant principle to be gleaned from 
Hallstrom is that unlike a purely non-jurisdictional rule, the notice 
provision must be interpreted strictly and without equitable 
considerations. The Court held that because RCRA’s notice 
requirement did not operate as a statute of limitations that is subject 
to equitable tolling, and because plaintiffs have full control over the 
timing of their RCRA suit,167 it was “not unfair to require strict 
compliance with statutory conditions precedent to suit.”168 
Interestingly, the Court affirmed the reasoning used by those circuit 
courts that held that the provision was jurisdictional. These courts 
focused on the plain language of the statute, while the other courts 
promoted a “pragmatic approach,” holding that strict compliance 
with the notice requirement was not necessary as long as the sixty 
days elapsed before the district court took action.169 This latter, 
rejected approach supposedly focused more on the role of the citizen 
in enforcing the environmental statutes.170 The dissent, on the other 
hand, accepted the pragmatic approach arguments and argued that 
Congress’s primary purpose was to encourage citizen suits.171 
Despite its rejection of the pragmatic approach, the Court 
expressly refused to answer whether RCRA’s notice provision was 
jurisdictional, despite an even 4-4 circuit split regarding the issue.172 
 
 164. Id. at 23–24. 
 165. Id. at 24. 
 166. Id. at 26. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 28. 
 169. See Samuels, supra note 153, at 112–13. 
 170. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 844 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1987) (overturned by 
Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20 (1989)). 
 171. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 33–37 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 172. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, for example, held that the provision 
was jurisdictional. See Garcia v. Cecos Intern., Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1985) (“We find 
that there is no federal jurisdiction here because the plaintiffs failed to follow the procedures 
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The Court recognized that the “parties have framed the question 
presented in this case as whether the notice provision is 
jurisdictional or procedural,” but dismissed this concern, saying that 
“[i]n light of our literal interpretation of the statutory requirement, 
we need not determine whether [the notice provision] is 
jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term.”173 The Court explained 
simply, “if an action is barred by the terms of a statute, it must be 
dismissed.”174 It quoted an earlier case, Fair Assessment in Real Estate 
Ass’n v. McNary,175 for the presumption that a requirement to 
exhaust state administrative remedies was a “mandatory condition[] 
precedent” to file a suit, and was therefore, in a sense, a 
jurisdictional precedent.176 The notice provision, similarly a 
“mandatory condition[] precedent,” allows parties to move to 
dismiss an action even after a court has determined a case on its 
merits177—a result permitted only under a FRCP Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In the 
aftermath of Hallstrom, most federal appellate courts (the First,178 
 
required for suits by private citizens under the statute.”); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 
311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We agree with the District Court in holding that compliance with the 
sixty day notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a suit against private 
defendants under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA . . . .”); City of Highland Park v. Train, 
519 F.2d 681, 690–91 (7th Cir. 1975) (agreeing with the district court that failure of notice was 
fatal to jurisdiction under Clean Air Act); Hallstrom, 844 F.2d at 599 (“We hold that proper 
notice is a precondition of the district court’s jurisdiction.”). 
On the other hand, the Second, Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits held that the provision 
was not jurisdictional. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 
1975) (holding that the notice requirement is not the exclusive jurisdictional basis for suit, and 
jurisdiction can therefore exist under either the general federal question statute, or the 
Administrative Procedure Act); Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 1980) (“We agree . . . that reading section 505(b) to 
require dismissal and refiling of premature suits would be excessively formalistic.”); Hempstead 
Cnty. & Nevada Cnty. Project v. U.S. E.P.A., 700 F.2d 459, 463 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
“the purpose of such notice” had been satisfied in the case, so the notice requirement in RCRA 
was not jurisdictional); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702, app. A at 721 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The limitations” in subsections (a) and (b) of the CWA “do not cut back on 
federal court jurisdiction over actions that would be maintainable” under section (e), which 
states that “[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of 
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent 
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief . . . .”). 
 173. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31. 
 174. Id. 
 175. 454 U.S. 100, 137 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 176. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31. 
 177. Id. at 32. 
 178. Francisco Sanchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Accepting 
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Third,179 Sixth,180 Seventh,181 Ninth,182 and Eleventh183 Circuits) 
have interpreted the diligent prosecution bar to be jurisdictional, 
despite the Court’s explicit refusal to confirm that it was 
jurisdictional. Only the Second Circuit explicitly disagreed,184 and 
the Fourth Circuit has declined to rule either way, but maintained 
that the notice provision is a mandatory condition precedent to 
suit.185 
2. The Fifth Circuit failed to recognize a glaring internal inconsistency in the 
Seventh Circuit precedent cited for support of its holding 
The LEAN court cited a Seventh Circuit RCRA case to support 
its conclusion that the diligent prosecution bar is not 
jurisdictional.186 RCRA is an environmental statute that was enacted 
around the time that the CWA was passed, and is the primary law 
governing the disposal of solid and hazardous waste, intended to 
address the problem of industrial and municipal waste.187 The 
 
[the notice requirement] would divest us of jurisdiction.”). 
 179. Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1189 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that Hallstrom stood for the notion that the notice requirement was a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to suit). 
 180. Bd. of Trustees of Painesville Twp. v. City of Painesville, 200 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 
1999) (“This circuit has always required plaintiffs to adhere to § 1365’s notice provision because 
compliance with the notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to recovery under the 
[CWA].”). 
 181. Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers & Alliance for the Great Lakes v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 556 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 182. Covington v. Jefferson Cnty., 358 F.3d 626, 636 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining that 
RCRA notice provisions are jurisdictional under Hallstrom, and without compliance with a 
required notice provision, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 183. Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Cherokee Mining, LLC, 548 F.3d 986, 992 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (court assumed that because notice and filing requirements were met, a non-profit 
environmental organization’s suit will not be otherwise dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 184. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Buffalo v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 158 
n.14 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e assume that non-compliance with the pre-suit . . . provisions of 
the [RCRA] and the [CWA] does not affect a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
 185. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 400 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e need not determine whether the mandatory notice requirement of 
§ 1365(b)(1)(A) is ‘jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term.’” (quoting Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989))). 
 186. La. Envtl. Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 749 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 187. History of RCRA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osw/laws-
regs/rcrahistory.htm (last updated July 30, 2013). 
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RCRA case, Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc.,188 involved a citizen suit 
brought by residents in an area near a solid waste dump alleging 
RCRA violations. The solid waste company moved to dismiss the 
lawsuit, arguing that the district court did not have federal subject-
matter jurisdiction over RCRA.189 The Adkins court rejected the 
argument that the diligent prosecution bar was jurisdictional, citing 
the Supreme Court’s recent clarifications on the limited scope of the 
term.190 LEAN cited Adkins to be particularly relevant because it 
correctly pointed out that RCRA’s diligent prosecution provision is 
virtually identical to the CWA’s.191 
However, there seems to be confusion even within the Seventh 
Circuit about whether the diligent prosecution bar is jurisdictional. 
While that circuit argued that it was not jurisdictional in Adkins, a 
few years earlier, in Friends of Milwaukee Rivers, that same court 
argued that it was jurisdictional in the CWA context. Thus, LEAN’s 
reliance on Adkins is somewhat puzzling. The Fifth Circuit seems to 
randomly choose which Seventh Circuit case to cite, and it chooses 
Adkins, a RCRA case, instead of the Friends of Milwaukee Rivers case, 
which arguably might be more on point since it is interpreting the 
same statute as the LEAN court was interpreting—the CWA. This 
brings up the second, more perplexing issue, as to why the Seventh 
Circuit would so clearly deviate from its own precedent in the first 
place and hold that the diligent prosecution bar is jurisdictional in 
one context (CWA), and non-jurisdictional in another, very similar 
context (RCRA). One possibility would be that the internal 
inconsistency in the Seventh Circuit is indicative of the 
mischaracterization of claim-processing rules as jurisdictional, but 
why then would that court suddenly change its view of subject-
matter jurisdiction? If the Seventh Circuit was so concerned about 
the Supreme Court’s shifting view of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
why did it not reflect this concern in Friends of Milwaukee Rivers, 
which was decided in 2009, years after the Court’s holdings in cases 
such as Kontrick and Arbaugh? The decision of the LEAN court to rely 
on a RCRA case when a CWA case was more on-point is troubling, 
at best. 
 
 188. 644 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 189. Id. at 490. 
 190. Id. at 491. 
 191. La. Envtl. Action Network, 677 F.3d at 749. 
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B. Congress Intended the Diligent Prosecution Bar to Be Quasi-jurisdictional 
Thus, two of the major arguments relied upon by the Fifth 
Circuit are simply invalid. Indeed, the LEAN court’s Henderson 
textual argument that the diligent prosecution bar is non-
jurisdictional because it is placed next to a non-jurisdictional 
provision such as the notice provision fails. Its conclusion must be 
rejected for the reasons provided in Part IV.A.1, but its reasoning 
should be adopted. In other words, the diligent prosecution bar is 
placed next to a quasi-jurisdictional provision, ergo, it must also be 
quasi-jurisdictional. There is no reason under Henderson to treat one 
notice provision (the sixty-day requirement) differently from another 
notice provision (the diligent prosecution bar). 
When looking at the various court holdings concerning the 
jurisdictionality of the notice requirements, it becomes evident that 
these holdings are a hodgepodge of decisions that are inherently 
inconsistent with each other. Hallstrom, the only Supreme Court case 
in the mix, argues for a quasi-jurisdictional reading, and the Seventh 
Circuit seemingly cannot make up its mind—in 2009, the provision 
was jurisdictional, and in 2011, it was not. Only more confusion is in 
store, and courts ruling on environmental law will continue to 
contradict their precedent and struggle to understand 
jurisdictionality. 
Clarity is needed, and the answer is not, as the Seventh Circuit 
would contend, that the provision is non-jurisdictional. The sixty-
day notice provision is not a typical claim-processing rule to be 
treated as having no jurisdictional attributes whatsoever, as the Fifth 
Circuit held. Neither is the provision a substantive-merits rule, for 
that matter. Claim-processing rules and substantive-merits rules are 
subject to equitable exceptions such as waiver, estoppel, and 
equitable tolling, but the Court in Hallstrom held that the notice 
provision is not subject to such exceptions.192 Further, the Hallstrom 
opinion maintained that a court must dismiss the action if the notice 
requirement is not made.193 These clearly jurisdictional attributes of 
the notice provision preclude it from being a typical non-
jurisdictional rule. The theory of quasi-jurisdictionality is the most 
convincing way to reconcile Hallstrom with the recent Supreme Court 
 
 192. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989). 
 193. Id. at 32. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:16 AM 
1395 Is the Clean Water Act’s Diligent Prosecution Bar Jurisdictional? 
 1421 
movement against drive-by jurisdictional holdings and the concerns 
articulated by the LEAN court. Hallstrom was not an example of a 
drive-by jurisdictional holding lacking in reasoning, and thus it is 
difficult to imagine that the Court, if the matter of jurisdictionality in 
these provisions is ever reheard, would assign it to the same fate as 
the statute in Arbaugh or Reed. The CWA’s notice provision and 
diligent prosecution bar are more akin to the statute of limitations in 
John R. Sand & Gravel Co.—not quite jurisdictional, not quite non-
jurisdictional. 
Now that it has been established that Congress meant for the 
diligent prosecution bar to be quasi-jurisdictional, the next step is to 
determine what this means. This Comment proposes that Congress 
meant for the provision to have jurisdictional attributes, specifically, 
that the rule will impose mandatory conditions and will not be 
subject to equitable considerations. At the same time, Congress did 
not intend for courts to be responsible for raising this issue sua 
sponte, as this has never been done before. 
This proposal has many advantages. Firstly, this approach is 
likely most consistent with Congress’s intent, for the reasons given 
in Hallstrom. Secondly, it is logically consistent. Unlike a deadline for 
filing a suit, for example, it does not make sense to provide equitable 
considerations to the diligent prosecution bar. Imagine a case where 
the government is able to consent to the charge that it did not 
diligently prosecute a case. This is such a central issue that the entire 
case would fall apart. If the government had diligently prosecuted, 
the courts would have no reason to intervene, especially in light of 
the fact that the purpose of citizen suits is to supplement, rather 
than supplant, government action.194 Thirdly, rigidity incentivizes 
compliance with the rule and promotes finality.195 If the government 
knew that it could not bring up equitable defenses, the threat of a 
citizen suit would have more teeth. The government would know 
that if, in the event of a lawsuit, it did indeed diligently prosecute a 
polluter, the case would be thrown out at the onset of litigation. 
On the flip side of the same coin, the fact that the provision is 
not purely jurisdictional gives the court flexibility and saves judicial 
resources because the court is not obligated to bring up the rule sua 
sponte. Because the rule is quasi-jurisdictional, the court can be 
 
 194. See supra Part III.A. 
 195. Dodson, supra note 37, at 1449. 
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flexible in deciding the order in which it will hear claims. The rule 
will also allow for resequencing; thus, if there are other threshold 
issues that are less complicated than the question of diligent 
prosecution,196 courts are able to dismiss a case for those reasons 
instead. The fact that the court and the parties are not able to 
dismiss the case once the case is over (unlike when courts use 
jurisdictional rules) saves judicial resources and ensures that money 
is not wasted on pointless litigation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The diligent prosecution bar is a quasi-jurisdictional rule that 
cannot be invoked to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, but also imposes mandatory conditions on parties to a 
case. This conceptualization of jurisdictionality is different from the 
prevailing thought on the subject, but it is far superior, for reasons 
explored in this Comment. This “middle path”197 clears up much 
confusion that courts have had in addressing the issue of 
jurisdictionality. This theory reconciles Hallstrom with the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding (but not its dicta) that the diligent prosecution bar 
is non-jurisdictional. Accepting that a rule need not be strictly 
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional permits courts to examine the 
spectrum of permissible characteristics and mold a rule according to 
their interpretation of Congress’s intent. 
It is important to stress that citizen suits will not be discouraged 
if the diligent prosecution bar is held to be quasi-jurisdictional. 
There might be slightly fewer citizen suits admitted under this 
theory as opposed to a strictly non-jurisdictional theory, because 
equitable defenses will be forbidden. In other words, if the defense 
argues that the government diligently prosecuted a case and the 
court is persuaded, the court will be required to dismiss the case. 
However, unlike a jurisdictional rule, the court is not obligated to 
raise this issue sua sponte.198 The phrase “slightly fewer citizen 
suits” will be stressed again; there is no suggestion that such a large 
number of defendants are seeking equitable defenses that they are 
not diligently prosecuting a suit. Despite the fact that there will 
 
 196. See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 
743 (2009). 
 197. Dodson, supra note 27, at 6. 
 198. See supra Part II.A. 
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necessarily be slightly fewer citizen suits, this is nothing to fear. The 
Supreme Court in Hallstrom stressed that the legislative history of 
environmental laws indicates a congressional intent to strike a 
balance between encouraging citizen enforcement and avoiding 
burdening the federal courts with excessive citizen suits.199 
Congress intended that governments act as the primary enforcers of 
environmental laws, with the need for citizen suits disappearing 
once the government diligently prosecutes.200 Thus, Congress never 
intended to allow citizens to bring suits in situations where the 
government was diligently prosecuting a case. Interpreting the 
diligent prosecution bar to be quasi-jurisdictional only helps further 
congressional intent to treat citizen suits as supplementary to 
government action. 
Properly labeling the diligent prosecution bar as quasi-
jurisdictional is a revolutionary way of understanding 
jurisdictionality. This interpretation rejects the strict dichotomy 
utilized by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit and admits 
fluidity and accommodation into civil procedure. While this new 
understanding may complicate matters,201 it will eliminate the harsh 
results plaintiffs often suffer when they fail to fulfill the 
requirements of a rule and their entire case is dismissed regardless of 
the merits. With this third option, legislative intent for the proper 
role of citizen suits will be respected, plaintiffs will be ensured that 
cases decided in their favor cannot later be dismissed for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, and defendant governments will benefit 
from a mandatory rule that will require dismissal of cases where they 
did, in fact, do their job. 
 







 199. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 32927 
(1970) (comments of Sen. Muskie)). 
 200. See supra Part III.A. 
 201. Dodson, supra note 37, at 1482. 
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